Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7

Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@...>
---
.../apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch | 138 ++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 139 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch

diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62a6a3844e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <covener@...>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-37436
+
+SECURITY: CVE-2022-37436 (cve.mitre.org)
+
+Prior to Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55, a malicious backend can
+cause the response headers to be truncated early, resulting in
+some headers being incorporated into the response body. If the
+later headers have any security purpose, they will not be
+interpreted by the client.
+
+git-svn-id: git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7]
+CVE: CVE-2022-37436
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@...>
+---
+ modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ server/protocol.c | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+index d74ae05..04dd221 100644
+--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static void process_proxy_header(request_rec *r, proxy_dir_conf *c,
+ * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing
+ * what was read by ap_getline() upon return.
+ */
+-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
++static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+ char *buffer, int size,
+ conn_rec *c, int *pread_len)
+ {
+@@ -820,19 +820,26 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+ rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr,
+ AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len);
+
+- if (len <= 0)
+- break;
+
+- if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
+- /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn.
+- * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead?
+- */
+- int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
+- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
+- "header size is over the limit allowed by "
+- "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
+- "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
+- size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) {
++ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
++ int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
++ "header size is over the limit allowed by "
++ "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
++ "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
++ size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
++ }
++ else {
++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404)
++ "Error reading headers from backend");
++ }
++ r->headers_out = NULL;
++ return rc;
++ }
++
++ if (len <= 0) {
++ break;
+ }
+ else {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer);
+@@ -855,7 +862,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+ if (psc->badopt == bad_error) {
+ /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */
+ r->headers_out = NULL;
+- return;
++ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
+ else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) {
+ /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then
+@@ -869,13 +876,13 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+ "in headers returned by %s (%s)",
+ r->uri, r->method);
+ *pread_len = len;
+- return;
++ return APR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ else {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099)
+ "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)",
+ r->uri, r->method);
+- return;
++ return APR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+@@ -905,6 +912,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+ process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value);
+ saw_headers = 1;
+ }
++ return APR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -1218,10 +1226,10 @@ int ap_proxy_http_process_response(proxy_http_req_t *req)
+ "Set-Cookie", NULL);
+
+ /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */
+- ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
+- origin, &pread_len);
++ rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
++ origin, &pread_len);
+
+- if (r->headers_out == NULL) {
++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106)
+ "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)",
+ major, minor, r->uri, r->method);
+diff --git a/server/protocol.c b/server/protocol.c
+index 7adc7f7..6f9540a 100644
+--- a/server/protocol.c
++++ b/server/protocol.c
+@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ cleanup:
+ /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */
+ bytes_handled = strlen(*s);
+ if (bytes_handled < *read) {
++ ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf,
++ "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0);
+ *read = bytes_handled;
+ if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
+ rv = APR_EINVAL;
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb
index 2bda18d2d2..8b98865641 100644
--- a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb
+++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/httpd/httpd-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://0008-Fix-perl-install-directory-to-usr-bin.patch \
file://0009-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch \
file://CVE-2022-36760.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-37436.patch \
"

SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \
--
2.25.1