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[kirkstone][PATCH 1/1] xserver-xorg: fix CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551
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Soumya
A vulnerability classified as critical was found in X.org Server. Affected
by this vulnerability is the function _GetCountedString of the file xkb/xkb.c. The manipulation leads to buffer overflow. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-211051. A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in X.org Server. Affected by this issue is the function ProcXkbGetKbdByName of the file xkb/xkb.c. The manipulation leads to memory leak. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-211052. References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3550 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3551 Upstream patches: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Signed-off-by: Soumya <soumya.sambu@...> --- ...possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch | 63 +++++++++++++++++++ ...ntedString-against-request-length-at.patch | 38 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 101 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e61ec5953 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +CVE: CVE-2022-3551 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@...> + +From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@...> +Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName + +GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we +fail somewhere. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@...> +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client) + xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc; + status = Success; + str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1]; +- if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status)) /* keymap, unsupported */ +- return BadMatch; ++ { ++ char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); /* keymap, unsupported */ ++ if (keymap) { ++ free(keymap); ++ return BadMatch; ++ } ++ } + names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); + names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); + names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); + names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); + names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); +- if (status != Success) ++ if (status == Success) { ++ len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff); ++ if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length) ++ status = BadLength; ++ } ++ ++ if (status != Success) { ++ free(names.keycodes); ++ free(names.types); ++ free(names.compat); ++ free(names.symbols); ++ free(names.geometry); + return status; +- len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff); +- if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length) +- return BadLength; ++ } + + CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask); + CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask); +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f862e82f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +CVE: CVE-2022-3550 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@...> + +From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@...> +Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks + +GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the +request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length +field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a +swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@...> +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str) + CARD16 len; + + wire = *wire_inout; ++ ++ if (client->req_len < ++ bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer)) ++ return BadValue; ++ + len = *(CARD16 *) wire; + if (client->swapped) { + swaps(&len); +-- +2.34.1 + -- 2.25.1 |
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Steve Sakoman
On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 6:44 AM Soumya <soumya.sambu@...> wrote:
You forgot to add the patches to the recipe! Steve
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